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1 Introduction
New firms play an important role in knowledge-based economies (van Praag and Versloot,
2007). They contribute to the introduction of new products as well as to the diffusion of new
technologies (Audretsch, Link, Sauer and Siegel, 2016). In particular radical innovations
are more likely to be implemented by new than by established firms (Acs and Audretsch,
1988; Caggese, 2019). New firms also create jobs (Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2013).
The returns to new firm creation, however, are not fully appropriated by the entrepreneur.
Social returns may exceed private returns through the value generated by new products or
improved processes. Moreover, firms entering markets with novel, complex products are
particularly prone to suffer from the liability of newness which can be a barrier to new firm
success (Ostgaard and Birley, 1994).
Public support of new firms therefore aims to help to overcome financing constraints.
The effectiveness of subsidies for start-ups in achieving this goal has been examined in
a series of studies suggesting that direct financial support fosters start-up innovation and
growth (Colombo, Giannangeli and Grilli, 2012; Colombo, Grilli and Murtinu, 2011; Howell,
2017; Conti, 2018; Hottenrott and Richstein, 2020). Research further suggests that the
effects go beyond direct financial aid by triggering second order effects in terms of access
to (follow-on) financing provided by other lenders (Hottenrott, Lins and Lutz, 2018) or
investors (Lerner, 1999; Söderblom, Samuelsson, Wiklund and Sandberg, 2015; Howell,
2017; Hottenrott and Richstein, 2020; Zhao and Ziedonis, 2020). These second order effects
may explain why initially small amounts of public funding result in measurable effects.
This study contributes to understanding these second order effects by distinguishing the
extent to which public support attracts different sources of venture capital (VC) financing.
Different investor types pursue different goals and to some investors public support may be
more valuable than for others (Hsu, Haynie, Simmons and McKelvie, 2014; Tykvová, 2018).
We distinguish between Government Venture Capital (GVC), Independent Venture Capital
(IVC), Corporate Venture Capital (CVC), and Business Angels (BA). Using data on 9,743
start-ups founded between 2005 and 2016 in knowledge-intensive sectors in Germany that
are potentially of interest to venture capital investors, we show that there is a positive
correlation between public subsidies and all sources of VC. When taking into account the
selection into subsidy programs, however, the second order financing effect can only be
linked to GVC and BA financing.
2 Public Subsidies and VC
VC has become increasingly important in the financing of new firms even in countries
that traditionally had comparably low levels of VC. The empirical setting for the following
study is Germany for which Figure 1 shows that VC financing increased substantially from
2006 to 2016 (left panel). Figure 1 also illustrates that there is a mix of VC providers that
became equally important over time.
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Figure 1: Sources of VC
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Sources: IAB/ZEW Startup Panel, Bureau van Dijk, Majunke Consulting. Own calculations.
Previous research shows that new firms that receive subsidies are more likely to raise
VC funding (Lerner, 1999; Howell, 2017; Conti, 2018; Hottenrott and Richstein, 2020;
Zhao and Ziedonis, 2020). Publicly financed startups may appeal to VC investors for
at least two reasons. First, public subsidies carry an information value. Second, they
finance risky early stage activities. Although VC investors are typically well informed
about industry prospects and perform own assessments (Shepherd, 1999), the information
value that they extract from public subsidies may depend on the investor type. While
it is often argued that subsidies may reveal quality-related information about a firm, the
information value could also be related to aspects of regulatory uncertainty and societal
returns to the firms’ activities. Public funding agencies, that allocate subsidies may have
an information advantage about new technologies, their regulation, and their longer-run
prospects (Lerner, 1999). Such information should be more valuable to investors who
acquire less information through formal due diligence processes or formal networks as is
the case for BA (Fiet, 1995). For these investors the information value of subsidies should
be relatively higher as they acquire less information ex-ante and often base their investment
decisions on heuristic assessments (Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Maxwell, Jeffrey and Lévesque,
2011). Moreover, like GVC, BA may pursue goals other than pure economic profit by
investing in firms that fit their mission and their desire to contribute to society (Hsu et al.,
2014). Especially GVC and BA may therefore understand the award of a public subsidy
as a signal of these prospects.
In addition, Howell (2017) argues that firms use the awarded money to advance their
project thereby reducing technological uncertainty, and reach a proof-of-concept stage,
making them more attractive to VCs. Similarly, Hottenrott and Richstein (2020) find
that when firms receive grants combined with publicly backed loans, the VC probability
is higher than in the case of grants alone. Therefore, it may not be the information value
alone, but also the funding amount that attracts investors.
How much of these channels matter may depend on the source of VC. For IVC investors
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it is typically the return on investments that matters in the first place (Hsu et al., 2014)
and their due diligence may allow them to collect sufficient information so that the subsidy
carries little additional information value about technological market prospects, quality of
the business model or founder characteristics. The cash inflow from the subsidy may still
increase firms’ attractiveness as it allows financing of uncertain early stage investments.
CVC decisions may also rely on the corporate’s own expert knowledge. Moreover, the
economic profit of the venture may not be the most important aspect in the CVC objective
function. The CVC may pursue strategic goals (Riyanto and Schwienbacher, 2006) which
reduces both the information value of subsidies as well as of the uncertainty reducing early
stage investment. Public subsidies may still serve as a talent and technology screening
device. Corporations may observe grant competitions and participating startups may
therefore be simply more visible to CVC funds compared to others.
Previous studies, however, do not distinguish between the sources of VC leaving the
question open whether the observed link between the subsidy and VC is driven by a specific
type of investor. Understanding this has implications for assessing the overall impact of
start-up subsidies.
3 Data
The firm-level data for the analysis stems from the IAB/ZEW Start-up Panel (Fryges,
Gottschalk and Kohn, 2009) for the founding cohorts 2008 to 2018, Bureau van Dijk’s
Zephyr data base as well as from transaction data published by Majunke Consulting. The
final sample covers information from 9,743 firms of which 35% received start-up subsidies
and 2.7% some form of VC. Subsidies include grants, subsidized loans and guarantees.
When looking at VC-funding in subsidized versus non-subsidized firms, we see that in
more recent founding cohorts, a larger share of subsidized firms received VC (Figure 2). See
Appendix A for a detailed data description. Tables A.1 and A.2 summarize the variables.
Table 1 present differences between the group of subsidized and non-subsidized start-ups in
terms of founder and firm characteristics and shows that the groups differ considerable in
their observable characteristics poiting to the importance of accounting for these differences
in the following analysis.
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Figure 2: VC investments by founding cohorts













Sources: Bureau van Dijk, Majunke Consulting, Mannheim Startup Panel. Own calculations.
4 Empirical methodology
To investigate the link between subsidies and venture capital, we estimate linear probability
models such that:
XV Cit = α+ βSubsidyit + γXit + τt + φi + uit,
where XV Cit is an indicator variable that switches to 1 in the year when startups re-
ceive their first venture capital investment from one of the investor types in XV C =
{GV C,BA, IV C,CV C}. Subsidyit is an indicator variable that switches to 1 in the year
when startups receive their first public subsidy, Xit is a set of control variables and τt and
φi are year and company specific fixed factors, of which the latter are unobserved.
We estimate pooled models as well as a within estimator which accounts for unobserved
time-constant firm characteristics. Yet, the key variable of interest - subsidy receipt - is
not randomly assigned to firms. A correlation between subsidy receipt and VC financing
could be due to common drivers of both outcomes rather than a causal link between the
two.
To address the selection into the group of subsidized firms, we perform matching tech-
niques (Rubin, 2005). We follow Hottenrott and Richstein (2020) and use a combination of
propensity score matching (PSM) and exact matching (EM). See Appendix B for details.
Table 1 shows the variables used in the PSM. Additionally, we match exactly on founding
year, industry, and sector. The balance of the covariates improves through the matching so
that there are no significant differences between treated and control firms anymore. Figure
A.1 shows the distributions of propensity scores after matching and Table A.3 shows the
balancing of the controls.
5




Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. ∆ t
Controls
Founder age (log) 3.680 0.216 3.710 0.252 0.029 6.05
Team 0.537 0.499 0.440 0.496 -0.097 -9.19
Academic 0.716 0.451 0.682 0.466 -0.034 -3.49
Female 0.170 0.375 0.166 0.372 -0.004 -0.52
Industry experience 12.950 9.290 13.739 10.309 0.789 3.85
Founding experience 0.498 0.500 0.606 0.489 0.107 10.20
Failure experience 0.175 0.380 0.211 0.408 0.036 4.35
Opportunity driven 0.493 0.500 0.483 0.500 -0.010 -0.99
R&D 0.520 0.500 0.403 0.491 -0.117 -11.11
Patent 0.071 0.257 0.051 0.220 -0.020 -3.87
Panel B: matched
N=2208 N=1756
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. ∆ t
Propensity score 0.255 0.151 0.254 0.149 0.001 0.215
5 Results
Table 2 shows the main estimation results. Panel A shows the results for the unmatched
sample, Panels B and C show pooled OLS and fixed effects models on the matched sample,
respectively. The first column in Panel B indicates that receiving a public subsidy more
than doubles the probability to receive VC relative to non-recipients (109%).1 Looking at
the different sources of VC, we observe that subsidized firms are significantly more likely
to receive GVC or BA investments, but not more likely to receive CVC and IVC. This is in
contrast to the models on the unmatched sample in which we observe positive correlations
with all sources of VC. This result is even more pronounced in the within estimation (Panel
C) which additionally accounts for unobserved heterogeneity among firms (Tables A.6-A.4
shows the full estimation results with and without matching). Since the four VC-types
may co-occur, we also estimate the four equations jointly and find that the results are
robust to this alternative specification (see Tables A.9 and A.10 for regression results and
Table A.11 for error correlation across equations). In this specification, we test whether the
coefficients for subsidy receipt are significantly different in the GVC versus BA equation
and find that the coefficients are not statistically different (χ2(1) = 1.21, p-value = 0.27).
See Table A.12 for all pair-wise comparisons.
1The marginal effect of 0.0026 refers to the difference in the predicted probability of VC in both groups.




Panel A: POLS (unmatched)
VC GVC BA IVC CVC
Subsidy(t) 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Obs. 55052 55321 55676 55599 55839
Panel B: POLS (matched)
Subsidy(t) 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Obs. 24978 25105 25285 25209 25327
Panel C: Within (matched)
Subsidy(t) 0.0058∗∗ 0.0042∗∗ 0.0031∗ 0.0013 0.0012
(0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0010)
Groups 3953 3955 3963 3961 3961
Obs. 24978 25105 25285 25209 25327
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Panels A and B include year, industry and region fixed effects, and firm controls.
Panel C includes year and firm fixed effects.
6 Conclusion
Previous research suggested that start-ups with public subsidies are more likely to receive
VC. Our results confirm this even after accounting for selection effects. However, our
results show that this positive relationship exists for GVC and BA financing, but not for
VC from other investors. The result that GVC and BA funding is most sensitive to public
start-up funding could have three reasons. First, to the extent that public funding agencies
are considered knowledgeable, their start-up support may convey a valuable legitimizing
endorsement. The information value of a subsidy award may, however, decrease with the
degree of ex-ante information acquisition of the financier. Second, additional financial
resources matter more to GVC and BA compared to other investors. Third, there is an
inherent link between the two sources. In the case of GVC, subsidies could be provided
with the explicit hint of the funder to seek GVC. There may also be advantages when
pitching for GVC for firms that have previously dealt with public agencies either through
learning about their expectations or simply through (personal) connections. Unlike for
private VC, public subsidies and GVC could even be conditioned on one another. Yet, the
data that we analysed here suggests that the increase in the share of VC in subsidized firms
is largely driven by BA - a source of funding that became considerably more important.
Our results suggest that the second order effects of start-up subsidies are not guaranteed,
but may depend on the active investor mix in a country. Finally, we strongly encourage
research in other settings in order to understand the generalizability of this result.
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Appendices
Supplemental Material for ‘Public Subsidies and the Sources
of Venture Capital’
A Data description
We use information from four primary databases to conduct our analysis.
Data on startups. Our primary data source is the IAB/ZEW Startup Panel,2 which
is based on a yearly survey among startups in Germany, administered by the Institute for
Employment Research and ZEW - Leibniz Centre for Europen Economic Research. The
sample of startups that enter the survey are drawn as a stratified random sample from
the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MEP),3 a comprehensive database of the population of
German firms. When startups enter the survey, they are at least one and at most three
years old, and remain in the sample until a maximum age of seven years. Importantly
for our analysis, it contains detailed information on the use of public subsidies in startup
companies. Startups are asked to indicate whether they have received public subsidies
in the form of subsidized loans, grants, or guarantees. For the purpose of this paper,
we consider all forms of subsidies jointly.4 Note that only for companies first surveyed
in their founding year we know the exact year of the first subsidy receipt. From these
companies we know that 85% of startups that receive a subsidy, receive it in their year of
foundation. For the group of startups for which the founding year and the first reference
year are not equal, we assume that they receive their first subsidy in the founding year.
We conduct robustness checks to check whether this assumption is material to the results
and re-estimate all models only including firms that we observe from the first year onward
(see Table A.8).
To control for founder and firm characteristics, we use information on founders’ gender,
educational background, founding and industry experience, as well as whether firms were
founded by a team. In addition we include firms’ founding year, their sector of activity
and location. The innovation potential is proxied by an indicator for firms R&D activity
and their Intellectual Property (IP) in terms of patents, as well as a variable indicating
whether firms were founded based on a concrete business idea.
Venture capital transactions. To identify startups that receive venture capital in-
vestments, we use transaction data from two primary data sources. The first is Bureau
van Dijk’s Zephyr data base which contains information on worldwide M&A transactions,
2See Fryges et al. (2009) for details.
3The MEP is based on data from creditreform - Germany’s largest credit raging agency - and maintained
and administered by the ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research in Mannheim. For more
details on the MEP see Bersch, Gottschalk, Müller and Niefert (2014).
4Previous research suggest that there are differences between grants and loans with regard to incen-
tivizing R&D versus tangible investments, but that in terms of their role for VC, both policy tools are
quite similar (Hottenrott and Richstein, 2020).
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including venture capital transactions. We use information on minority stake acquisitions
through venture capital financing in the period from 2005 to 2018, where the target com-
pany is located in Germany. Zephyr has been used for a recent large scale research project
on venture capital in Europe to identify i.a. German venture capital transactions (Bertoni
and Martí, 2011). Zephyr has, however, a limited coverage for German venture capital
transactions. We therefore complement the Zephyr data with information from Majunke
Consulting, a private equity boutique that collects information on M&A, private equity,
and venture capital transactions in the DACH region.5 Majunke’s venture capital data
start in 2005 and the data set contains all information collected by Majunke up until 2018.
We match information on acquirers (i.e. venture investors) and target companies (star-
tups) with the MEP based on names and adresses. We identified 99% of startups from
the Zephyr database and 98% from Majunke’s data applying a fuzzy string matching algo-
rithm on company names and addresses.6 Once merged to the MEP, we can link the data
to the IAB/ZEW Startup Panel. In a next step, we classified investors into categories,
differentiating between independent and various types of captive venture capital investors
using information from investors’ websites, crunchbase, Bloomberg as well as ownership
information from the MEP. For our analysis we distinguish between four different types of
venture capital investors, government venture capital (GVC), independent venture capital
(IVC), corporate venture capital (CVC), and Business Angels (BA).
Sample. We focus on firms that are potentially relevant for venture capital investments.
Research on the venture capital market has shown consistently that venture capital invest-
ments are concentrated in certain sectors and certain types of start-ups (Lerner and Nanda,
2020). Therefore, we restrict the sample to knowledge-intensive sectors. That is, we discard
startups that are operating in construction, retail and consumer oriented services indus-
tries. We also discard startups that are operating as franchise companies or joint-ventures,
and keep only startups that are either limited liability companies or incorporations. After
the elimination of observations with missing values, the final sample comprises information
on 9,743 startups.
B Matching approach
Matching. We employ a matching procedure that combines propensity score matching
and coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King and Porro, 2012). The idea of matching is
to find observations that are reasonably comparable thereby adjusting the distribution of
pretreatment covariates by either excluding and/or reweighting observations. While exact
matching has several desirable properties, like an intuitive interpretation, and an upper
bound on the level of imbalance in the matched sample (Iacus, King and Porro, 2011),
i.e. the degree of variation between different specifications, it also has well known disad-
vantages. Most notably exact matching leads to small estimation samples, as it discards
5The DACH region comprises Germany (D), Austria (A) and Switzerland (CH).
6For the fuzzy string matching we used Thorsten Doherr’s SearchEngine:
https://github.com/ThorstenDoherr/searchengine
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any observation that is not within the set of strata defined by coarsened pretreatment
covariates of treated observations. This may lead to inefficient estimation.
Our matching algorithm proceeds in the following way: First, we narrow down a set
of control observations that must have been active in the year when treated observations
received their first subsidy. For those observations, we estimate the propensity score for
being treated, i.e. the treatment probability, using the covariates displayed in the upper
panel of Table 1, as well as indicators for industry, founding cohort and region. Second, we
apply caliper matching on the estimated propensity score, on which we place an additional
matching requirement. We only want to match observations that are from the same found-
ing cohort, a similar industry, and are located in a similar region. For those variables we
employ an exact matching algorithm. We implement the algorithm using the user written
Stata command ultimatch,7 which allows to blend different matching procedures.
C Additional Tables
Table A.1: Description of variables.
Variable Name Variable Description
Subsidy(T) The startup has received a subsidy as a grant or loan in any year.
VC(T) The startup received at least one investment by any venture capital investor in any
year.
GVC(T) The startup received at least one investment by an governmental venture capital
investor in any year.
IVC(T) The startup received at least one investment by an independent venture capital
investor in any year.
CVC(T) The startup received at least one investment by an corporate venture capital in-
vestor in any year.
BA(T) The startup received at least one investment by an angel investor in any year.
Startup age at VC (1) Age of the startup at first VC financing round.
Startup age Age of the startup in years.
Founder age Age of the founders at foundation, for teams it is the average founder age.
Team The startup was founded by more than one person.
Academic At least one founder has a university degree.
Female At least one founder is female.
Industry experience Years of industry experience at foundation.
Founding experience At least one founder has previously founded a company.
Failure experience At least one founder has failed before.
Opportunity driven The startup was founded to realize a business idea.
R&D(T) The startup has conducted research and/or development activity in any year.
Patent The startup held a patent at foundation.
Founding year The startup’s year of foundation.
Industry The main industry the startup operates in.
Region The startups business location.
Notes: All of the variables used are binary variables. Except for Industry, Region and Founding Year,
which are categorical variables and industry experience and founder age which is measured in years.
7The command was developed by Thorsten Doherr: https://github.com/ThorstenDoherr/ultimatch
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Table A.2: Summary of variables
Firm Obs. Mean Std. Err. Min. Max.
Subsidy(T) 9743 0.351 0.477 0 1
Venture Capital
VC(T) 9743 0.027 0.161 0 1
GVC(T) 9743 0.018 0.135 0 1
BA(T) 9743 0.012 0.111 0 1
IVC(T) 9743 0.012 0.108 0 1
CVC(T) 9743 0.006 0.079 0 1
Startup age at VC(1) 261 1.632 1.733 0 10
Founders
Founder age 9743 41.573 9.744 17 95
Team 9743 0.474 0.499 0 1
Academic 9743 0.694 0.461 0 1
Female 9743 0.167 0.373 0 1
Industry experience 9743 13.462 9.969 0 59
Founding experience 9743 0.568 0.495 0 1
Failure experience 9743 0.198 0.399 0 1
Opportunity driven 9743 0.486 0.500 0 1
R&D(T) 9743 0.543 0.498 0 1
Patent 9743 0.058 0.234 0 1
Industry
Hightech manufacturing 9743 0.201 0.401 0 1
Hightech services & Software 9743 0.455 0.498 0 1
Nontech manufacturing 9743 0.131 0.337 0 1
B2B & Knowledge-int. services 9743 0.213 0.409 0 1
Region
West Germany 9743 0.824 0.381 0 1
Berlin 9743 0.062 0.240 0 1
East Germany 9743 0.114 0.318 0 1
Notes: Firm Obs. refers to the number of firms observed in the sample. The observation
period per firm varies depending on the founding year and the corresponding years in which
we observe the firm (the minimum number of observation periods is 1 year and the maximum
is 12 years, the median is 5 years). Subsidy(T) comprises different types of public subsidies
including grants (77% of subs. firms), subsidized loans (43% of subs. firms) and public
guarantees (18% of subs. firms).
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Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. ∆ t
Controls
Founder age (log) 3.691 0.214 3.691 0.242 -0.001 -0.075
Team 0.518 0.500 0.506 0.500 0.012 0.619
Academic 0.711 0.454 0.711 0.453 -0.000 -0.027
Female 0.162 0.369 0.173 0.378 -0.010 -0.698
Industry experience 13.591 9.304 13.675 10.233 -0.084 -0.220
Founding experience 0.521 0.500 0.529 0.499 -0.009 -0.451
Failure experience 0.183 0.386 0.170 0.376 0.012 0.884
Opportunity driven 0.482 0.500 0.480 0.500 0.002 0.119
R&D 0.537 0.499 0.547 0.498 -0.010 -0.532
Patent 0.066 0.248 0.063 0.243 0.003 0.290
Propensity score 0.255 0.151 0.254 0.149 0.001 0.215
Notes: Panel B shows the means, and differences in means (∆) after balancing. Differences
in means are the estimated coefficients of a weighted univariate regression of the control
variable on the treatment status. The regression weights are the balancing weights obtained
from the matching procedure described in section B. The standard errors and t-values are
calculated under the assumption of heteroskedasticity.
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Table A.4: Unmatched pooled models results
VC GVC BA IVC CVC
Subsidy(t) 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Startup age (log) -0.0044∗∗∗ -0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Founder age (log) -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗∗ -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0018∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Team 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Academic 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Female -0.0013∗ -0.0011∗ 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Industry experience -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Founding experience -0.0008 -0.0010∗ -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Failure experience 0.0004 0.0012∗ -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Opportunity driven 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗ 0.0006 0.0006∗ 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
R&D 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Patent 0.0004 0.0011 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0001
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.003
Obs. 55052 55321 55676 55599 55839
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Matched pooled models results
VC GVC BA IVC CVC
Subsidy(t) 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Startup age (log) -0.0047∗∗∗ -0.0035∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0008∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Founder age (log) -0.0072∗∗∗ -0.0044∗∗∗ -0.0047∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗ -0.0030∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0011)
Team 0.0023∗∗ 0.0019∗∗ 0.0003 0.0010 0.0006
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Academic 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Female -0.0018 -0.0011 0.0000 -0.0014∗∗ -0.0009∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Industry experience -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001∗ -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Founding experience -0.0013 -0.0017∗∗ -0.0009 0.0008 0.0000
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Failure experience 0.0006 0.0011 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0000
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0006)
Opportunity driven 0.0022∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0004)
R&D 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗ 0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Patent 0.0023 0.0028 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0008)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.003
Obs. 24978 25105 25285 25209 25327
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Unmatched within estimation results
VC GVC BA IVC CVC
Subsidy(t) 0.0049∗∗ 0.0029 0.0025 0.0023 0.0006
(0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0009)
Startup age (log) 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004)
R&D 0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0011
(0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0007)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002
Groups 9727 9731 9739 9738 9740
Obs. 55052 55321 55676 55599 55839
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.7: Matched within estimation results
VC GVC BA IVC CVC
Subsidy(t) 0.0058∗∗ 0.0042∗∗ 0.0031∗ 0.0013 0.0012
(0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0010)
Startup age (log) 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0008)
R&D 0.0014 0.0016 -0.0019∗∗ 0.0001 -0.0016∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0004)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
Groups 3953 3955 3963 3961 3961
Obs. 24978 25105 25285 25209 25327
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.8: Robustness test: Timing assumption
Panel A: POLS (unmatched)
VC GVC BA IVC CVC
Subsidy(t) 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0009∗ 0.0002 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Obs. 30962 31128 31216 31212 31324
Panel B: POLS (matched)
Subsidy(t) 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0013∗ 0.0005 0.0006
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Obs. 19698 19798 19847 19865 19913
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Panels A and B include year, industry and region fixed effects, and firm controls.
The sample includes only startups that enter the sample in their first year of operation.
Table A.9: Unmatched seemingly unrelated regression results
GVC BA IVC CVC
Subsidy(t) 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗ 0.0007∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Startup age (log) -0.0033∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Founder age (log) -0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0040∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Team 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Academic 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Female -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Industry experience -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Founding experience -0.0012∗∗ 0.0000 0.0007 -0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Failure experience 0.0016∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Opportunity driven 0.0011∗∗ 0.0006 0.0007∗ 0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
R&D 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Patent 0.0012 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0001
(0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Obs. 55977
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.
Year, industry and region fixed effects, and firm controls included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Matched seemingly unrelated regression results
GVC BA IVC CVC
Subsidy(t) 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0006
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Startup age (log) -0.0035∗∗∗ -0.0018∗∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0007∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Founder age (log) -0.0049∗∗ -0.0053∗∗∗ -0.0040∗∗ -0.0032∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0011)
Team 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0010 0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Academic 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Female -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0015∗∗ -0.0009∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Industry experience -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Founding experience -0.0018∗∗ -0.0008 0.0009 0.0000
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Failure experience 0.0020 0.0006 0.0006 0.0001
(0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0006)
Opportunity driven 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.0005 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004)
R&D 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗ 0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Patent 0.0034 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004
(0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0008)
Obs. 25410
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.
Year, industry and region fixed effects, and firm controls included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.11: Correlations of seemingly unrelated re-
gression results (after matching)
GVC ×BA 0.4757∗∗∗
(0.0893)
GVC ×IV C 0.2934∗∗∗
(0.0733)
GVC ×CV C 0.2283∗∗∗
(0.0694)
BA ×IV C 0.2739∗∗∗
(0.0753)
BA ×CV C 0.4054∗∗∗
(0.0999)
IVC ×CV C 0.2490∗∗
(0.1117)
Obs. 25410
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.12: Chi2-tests for equality of subsidy coefficients
Chi2 df p-value
GVC:Subsidy(t) vs. BA:Subsidy(t) 1.21 1 0.27
GVC:Subsidy(t) vs. IVC:Subsidy(t) 7.43 1 0.01
GVC:Subsidy(t) vs. CVC:Subsidy(t) 5.09 1 0.02
Chi2 df p-value
BA:Subsidy(t) vs. IVC:Subsidy(t) 3.80 1 0.05
BA:Subsidy(t) vs. CVC:Subsidy(t) 3.71 1 0.05
D Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Estimated probability for subsidy receipt before and after matching




























Notes: Panel A shows the kernel density estimates for the estimated probability of receiving
a subsidy for the group of startups that have in fact received a subsidy (red line) and those
that have not (black dashed line) before matching. Panel B shows the the same estimates
weighted by the balancing weights obtained from the matching procedure described in section
B. Kernel densities are estimated using a Gaussian kernel, the bandwidth is calculated using
Scott’s Rule, i.e n(−1/(d+4)), where n is the number of data points, and d the dimension








i ) is used, where wi is the weight of data point i.
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